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The contemporary global community is increasingly interdependent and confronted with systemic risks posed by the actions and interactions
of actors existing beneath the level of formal institutions, often operating outside effective governance structures. Frequently, these actors are
human agents, such as rogue traders or aggressive financial innovators, terrorists, groups of dissidents, or unauthorized sources of sensitive or
secret information about government or private sector activities. In other instances, influential “actors” take the form of climate change,
communications technologies, or socioeconomic globalization. Although these individual forces may be small relative to state governments or
international institutions, or may operate on long time scales, the changes they catalyze can pose significant challenges to the analysis and
practice of international relations through the operation of complex feedbacks and interactions of individual agents and interconnected
systems. We call these challenges “femtorisks,” and emphasize their importance for two reasons. First, in isolation, they may be inconse-
quential and semiautonomous; but when embedded in complex adaptive systems, characterized by individual agents able to change, learn
from experience, and pursue their own agendas, the strategic interaction between actors can propel systems down paths of increasing, even
global, instability. Second, because their influence stems from complex interactions at interfaces of multiple systems (e.g., social, financial,
political, technological, ecological, etc.), femtorisks challenge standard approaches to risk assessment, as higher-order consequences cascade
across the boundaries of socially constructed complex systems. We argue that new approaches to assessing and managing systemic risk in
international relations are required, inspired by principles of evolutionary theory and development of resilient ecological systems.
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Recent events and analyses have highlighted
the limitations of traditional approaches to
measuring systemic risk in complex adaptive
systems (CAS) in the sphere of international
affairs. Many recent developments related to
international systems—for example the 2008
financial crisis; the Arab Spring of 2011–
2012; the Ukrainian crisis of 2014; the rap-
idly changing Arctic; Hezbollah’s increas-
ing embeddedness in regional and global
politics; and global health risks arising from
zoonoses—reveal significant limitations to
understanding of 21st century international
systems and the risks posed by financial,
political, and technological developments.
The destabilizing potential consequences
of the actions of small-scale actors introduce
a new element to the analysis of complex
international systems, and indicate that new
approaches to analyzing and coping with
threats within CAS are required (1).
These risks reveal the challenges posed by
increasing interdependence in the international
sphere as the coupling of multiple natural
systems (e.g., climate, energy resource, and
ecological) with artificial, socially constructed,
and purposeful systems (e.g., financial, health
care, and technological) become tighter (2–5).
We introduce the term “femtorisks” to refer to
threats that confront international decision
makers as a result of the actions and interac-
tions of actors that exist beneath the level of
formal institutions or operate outside of estab-
lished governance structures. We chose that
term, using the prefix that denotes a factor of
10−15, to highlight the apparent insignificance
of the individual actor that might be a source
of such a risk, and to emphasize the status of
the femtorisk as a semiautonomous agent,
responding to and acting in its local environ-
ment. The use is analogous to the deployment
of the terms “femtocell” vs. “picocell” in the
world of cellular communications (6); that is,
following the use in cellular communications,
“femto-” here does not mean literally some-
thing 15 orders-of-magnitude smaller than
the macro scale, but just something many
orders-of-magnitude smaller.
Femtorisks may be pictured as small
fissures inside nodes arrayed along network
topologies of various sorts. The primary
feature of such risks is that they only
become apparent when the system topology
shifts in some fashion. The “revealing” of
femtorisks can be for internal or external
reasons (i.e., inside or outside the node or
system where the risk is present) but the
effect is the same: What once appeared
solid and risk-free becomes a locus for
systemic change, often in a catastrophic
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fashion with phase-transition and hysteresis
as possible outcomes.
In many cases, the actors that pose these
risks are human agents, such as rogue traders
or aggressive financial innovators, terrorists,
groups of dissidents, or unauthorized sources
of sensitive or secret information that reveal
government or private sector activities. In
other instances, these “actors” may take the
form of developments in climate change,
communications technologies, or socioeco-
nomic globalization. Any of these can alter
interactive circumstances between human
agents and produce events that exist far in
the tails of probability. These changes can
pose significant challenges to the governance
and management of major elements of global
societal support systems through the opera-
tion of complex feedbacks and interactions of
individual agents in profoundly interdepen-
dent systems (7).
In isolation, femtorisks may be small and
inconsequential; but when embedded in
CAS, their potential to propel systems down
paths of instability poses a significant chal-
lenge to the complex network of formal and
informal arrangements that underlie modern
economies and political systems. Because the
influences of femtorisks stem from interac-
tions at the interfaces of multiple systems
(e.g., social, financial, political, technological,
ecological, and so forth), complex inter-
actions between actors can often produce
macroscopic outcomes that cannot be de-
rived from examinations of individual choices
and action in isolation (8). These complex in-
teractions confound standard approaches to
risk assessment by creating low-probability/
high-impact events as second- and third-
order consequences cascade across systems’
boundaries (4, 9).
Broadly speaking, innovative ways of re-
fining the estimation and management of
femtorisks come in two complementary
forms. The first form requires improvements
in the quality of predictions about increas-
ingly small-scale actors, low-probability
events, and the cross-scale implications of
rapidly evolving technologies and relation-
ships. The second form involves the creation
of new ways of coping with uncertainties that
do not depend on precise forecasts of the
probability and consequences of future
events, but rather develop approaches to
negotiation, governance, and regulation that
incorporate an understanding of CAS and
the development of new means for measur-
ing and enhancing their robustness and
resilience under uncertainty (10). Al-
though continued scientific research in
a variety of domains will make better pre-
dictions possible, we argue that the latter
approach provides greater utility to risk
managers across a variety of domains that
are responsible for the governance of ele-
ments of the systems upon which global-
ized society depends. By drawing upon
lessons learned from evolutionary theory
and biological systems, new governing
regimes can be developed, ones designed
to cope with—even benefit from—the un-
certainty and dynamism in CAS.
Examples of Femtorisks in International
CAS
2008 Financial Crisis. The 2008 Financial
Crisis provides an example of a CAS in
which investors, regulators, and policymakers
were all lulled into a false sense of security by
focusing on variables that suggested the fi-
nancial system was stable and threats rela-
tively unimportant, while neglecting the
increasing complexity and scale that laid the
foundations for extraordinary losses. In 1998,
Commodities and Futures Trading Com-
mission Chairman Brooksley Born warned of
systemic risks resulting from credit default
swaps (CDS) and other derivatives securities.
However, at the time this market was rela-
tively small, stable, and highly liquid. The
aggregate notional exposure of the CDS
market in 1998 was $180 billion, a small
fraction of the financial industry’s total assets,
leading regulators to believe that intervention
was unnecessary. Thus, Born’s warnings were
dismissed by the Federal Reserve Chairman,
Treasury Secretary, and other regulators.
However, the rapid and unsupervised growth
of the CDS market led to aggregate notional
exposures of $6 trillion in 2004 and $58
trillion in 2007. Market volatility that was
regarded as unimportant just a few years
earlier brought down AIG, one of the largest
and most respected insurance companies in
the world. The nature of regulatory mecha-
nisms as either “on” or “off” meant that
regulators and other stakeholders failed to
notice or adapt to the changing circum-
stances of the market, the amount of capital
concentrated among a handful of big institu-
tions, and the dynamic characteristics of its
risk exposures. Thus, systemic risk increased
without notice and ultimately led to the worst
financial crisis since the Great Depression (11).
2010–2012 Arab Spring. The Arab
Spring began with the self-immolation of
Mohammad Bouazazi in Tunisia in De-
cember 2010 and persisted into 2012.
During this period, regimes in Tunisia,
Egypt, and Yemen all changed under the
pressure of popular protest, whereas Lib-
ya’s dictatorship fell in the face of armed
rebellion supported by NATO military
forces, and the Syrian state descended into
civil war that persists into the present. In
addition to those states that experienced
regime change or civil war, Algeria, Iraq,
Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Sudan, Maur-
itania, Oman, and Saudi Arabia all ex-
perienced social protests that invited
political reforms, drew harsh responses by
government security forces, or both. The events
of the Arab Spring demonstrated how small-
scale actions could combine with distinctive
local features of individual states and long-term
historical, regional and global factors to pro-
duce unexpected, rapid changes in composi-
tion of the region’s political structure (12).
The sources postulated in academic and
diplomatic analyses of the contagion of pro-
test and regime change of the Arab Spring
are varied, with outcomes seen as the
intersection between local circumstances,
short-term choices, and long-term trends,
and vulnerabilities established over decades.
Factors identified by experts on the region’s
history and politics include demographics,
unemployment, aging dictatorships, corrupt
and weak political institutions, nationalism,
food prices, social media, external influences,
the role of Mosques in social mobilization,
poor decision-making by political and mili-
tary leadership, and contagion dynamics (12–
15). For example, agricultural policies across
the region rendered the states of the Middle
East and North Africa among the world’s
largest importers of cereals: the Arab states
imported 50% of their food between 2006
and 2010, making regimes acutely vulnerable
to rising food prices (16). The weak agricul-
tural system in the region encouraged mi-
gration to cities, which ensured a deep
reserve of unemployed youth, primed for
action. New social media and communica-
tions technologies offered that restless de-
mographic the means for social mobilization
and a route to global attention; from these
converging elements, the coordination and
diffusion of antiregime activities emerged.
The many competing explanations for the
Arab Spring highlight the challenges facing
risk managers and policy analysts in the in-
ternational system. Although many signals of
political, economic, and societal fragility can
be identified ex post facto, no analytic or
conceptual framework was in place to pro-
vide policy makers with analyses that could
mitigate threats to, or ease the transition of,
established regimes (17).
2013–2014 Ukraine Crisis. The local up-
rising on Maidan Square in Kiev, Ukraine, in
the winter of 2013–2014 displays many
characteristics of femtorisks, with the full
consequences of their manifestation to be
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determined in the months and years ahead.
The Maidan demonstrations began in re-
sponse to the government’s decision not to
establish closer European economic integration
in November 2013. After a violent effort by the
government to disperse the protestors, popular
mobilization against the government expanded,
eventually forcing Viktor Yanukovych from
power in February 2014 (18).
The collapse of the Yanukovych regime
has triggered an ongoing governmental and
international crisis. The predominantly Rus-
sian ethnic population of Crimea voted to
secede from Ukraine in February 2014, with
the aim of joining the Russian state. Con-
tinuing unrest within the Russian-speaking
population of eastern Ukraine has resulted in
increasing Russian political and military iso-
lation and provocative diplomatic and mili-
tary maneuvers between Russia and NATO
members. Moreover, regular and irregular
military forces within Ukraine have maneu-
vered to capitalize on the vacuum of power
and legitimacy that followed the collapse of
the old regime, catalyzing an escalation in the
use of deadly weaponry in eastern Ukraine—
sometimes by poorly trained and disciplined
forces—that resulted in the downing of
Malaysian Air Flight 77 (19). As a result,
what started as a series of political demon-
strations against the Yanukovych govern-
ment’s reluctance to deepen Ukraine’s
integration into European economic and
political life, and its complementary tilt to-
ward closer economic and social integration
with Russia, has provoked the largest crisis
between great powers since the end of the
Cold War (20, 21).
1980s to Present Hezbollah. Hezbollah is
one of the world’s more sophisticated and
capable violent nonstate actors. The organi-
zation emerged during Lebanon’s 15-y civil
war, 1975–1990, and offered an official mani-
festo declaring loyalty to Iran’s Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, demanding the ex-
pulsion of United States, French, and Israeli
forces from Lebanese territory, and calling for
the destruction of Israel in 1985. Since that
time, it has been responsible for a variety of
terrorist attacks in the Middle East, Europe,
and Latin America. Hezbollah’s attacks have
included the use of hijacking, car and suicide
bombings, political assassination, kidnapping,
and a campaign of rocket attacks launched
from Lebanon into Israeli territory. In addi-
tion, Hezbollah has established political and
military autonomy over several regions of
Lebanon, and maintains the ability to operate
in Lebanon’s Shia communities along the
southern border with Israel, the Eastern
border with Syria, and the southern sectors
of Beirut.
Through a combination of political and
civic activities, Hezbollah has embedded itself
within the Lebanese state, operating a series
of parallel governance structures that provide
political, military, economic, and social ser-
vices that have established its local legitimacy
and autonomy from the official Lebanese
government. Over the last decade, the extent
to which Hezbollah has grown capable of
autonomously affecting regional conflict and
stability has become increasingly apparent
through notable events, such as its suspected
assassination of Rafic Hariri in 2005 and the
2006 conflict with Israel.
Climate Change in the Arctic. Climate
warming in the Arctic is triggering changes
in the region’s environmental, economic,
resource development, transportation, em-
ployment, population, and cultural systems,
embodying a CAS in which established actors
are adapting to changing strategic circum-
stances and to new entrants into region’s
physical and political domain: for example,
the 2013 addition of six observer nations into
the Arctic Council, most notably including
China (22). The rapid increase in accessibility
has increased interest in the region because
of the economic opportunities represented
by mining, energy resources, new shipping
routes, and increased tourism.
New mining opportunities in Greenland
offer an example of these cascading impli-
cations for the Arctic region. Geologists
have identified abundant deposits of rare
earth elements among the island’s rich
mineral resources, and mining companies
from around the world are competing for
the opportunity to develop these critical raw
materials for 21st century technologies. The
ramifications are already apparent in Green-
land’s politics and governance arrangements
with Denmark, as the mining scenarios could
transform the icy island’s economics,
and challenge its environmental regulation
framework (23). However, the production of
rare earth elements could also effect profound
change on the global supply of those crucial
minerals, and the debate on environmental
standards illuminate the challenges facing
the governments of these sparsely inhabited
regions. Moreover, the opportunities for
mineral resources are setting off a reexami-
nation of national boundaries, with both
Canada and Russia having announced in-
tentions to extend territorial claims to, and
beyond, the North Pole (24, 25).
Failure Modes of Conventional Risk
Assessment Approaches
Conventional risk assessment approaches
rely on the ability to accurately estimate the
probability and consequences of events that
may occur in the future (26–29). These
estimates rely on historical events and an
understanding of the systems characterizing
the risk. In the case of femtorisks, as the
examples noted above reveal, historical ex-
perience and an understanding of the sys-
tems are lacking. Risk assessment has thus
failed to provide decision-makers with the
means to manage some of the most difficult
challenges facing public and private sector
governance. Although they are not mutually
exclusive, these failure modes can be placed
into three categories: the static nature of risk
analysis with the need to estimate risk be-
yond the predictive limits of CAS, the im-
proper orientation of risk analysts in their
treatment of missing information and slow
variables, and inertia within decision-making
processes that limit the effectiveness of risk
assessments for organizational reasons.
Structure and Dynamics of CAS. The first
type of failure is grounded in conventional
risk management and policy-making para-
digms that assume that the behaviors of
systems are predictable, either with cer-
tainty or probabilistically. This approach
emphasizes the design of rational, utility-
maximizing choices and seeks improve-
ments through the development and re-
finement of predictive models. An implicit
assumption in such predictive efforts is that
the world is a stable system and historical
data can be used to infer the probabilistic
structure of the future.
However, CAS are composed of interact-
ing units that adapt and change in response
to actors buried deep within the system, as
well as to each other (30, 31). Moreover such
systems often accelerate the propagation of
randomness that emerges inside the system.
As a result, the ability of conventional risk
models to reflect the adaptations and feed-
backs of CAS, such as natural selection,
social learning, or strategic calculation, may
be limited, particularly when models in-
corporate the assumption that historical
patterns and relationships will persist into the
future (32). In fact, several CAS have dem-
onstrated a propensity for rapid restructuring
or transformation as innovative behaviors
diffuse, and result in periods where formerly
successful predictions fail quickly based on the
popularity of particular strategies or behaviors.
In an example from the financial sector,
the employment of Sharpe’s Capital Asset
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Pricing Model (33) in the 1970s led to the
practice of “passive investing” in broadly di-
versified portfolios of securities that repli-
cated indexes, such as the S&P 500, and has
become so widespread that virtually every
worker with an employee-sponsored pension
fund is now invested in such products. Al-
though the multitrillion-dollar index-fund
business successfully provided investors with
attractive returns at low fees for decades, its
popularity also implies a much more tightly
coupled system of investors in which a small
decline in the S&P 500 can quickly turn into
panic selling and a stock-market crash, as we
discovered on October 19, 1987.
Because they are generally nonstationary,
CAS do not conform to risk analysts’ char-
acterizations of “known” or even “unknown”
systems, whose properties are well suited for
traditional approaches to risk measurement
and management. Portrayal of “known”
systems denotes that the probability dis-
tributions of future states are completely
specified, as in the case of automobile- or life-
insurance claims (in the absence of large-
scale events, such as mass-casualty terrorist
attacks or natural disasters), whereas “un-
known” systems occur when all possible
states of the future system can be enumerated
but the probabilities associated with entering
into them cannot (27). Instead, CAS present
risk analysts and decision-makers with ig-
norance, or deep uncertainty, where all pos-
sible future states and their associated
probabilities cannot be specified (34–37).
Analytic Orientation. A second source of
failure in traditional risk approaches con-
cerns the analytic orientation of those re-
sponsible for measuring and managing risk
sources and levels. These analysts may im-
properly focus their attention on the collec-
tion and analysis of information that cannot
detect risks posed by impending phase tran-
sitions or regime changes in CAS (i.e., rapid
changes in the system’s structure and dy-
namics). In these instances, the information
necessary to provide accurate assessments
of risk may be available to analysts and
decision-makers, but the data have not
been collected or properly interpreted. As a
result, events that catch decision-makers
unprepared might have been anticipated
through the use of a different analytic and
data-collection framework.
The Arab Spring offers an important ex-
ample of this phenomenon. In the cases of
Tunisia and Egypt, the protesters were pre-
dominantly urban and secular youth, many of
whom had no prior history of political activ-
ism. They demanded democratic reforms and
the strengthening of state institutions through
the rule of law and abolition of endemic cor-
ruption. Their relative size and demands sur-
prised governments and observers alike, each
of which had previously focused on the tra-
ditional sources of antiregime rhetoric and
action from well-organized Islamist organ-
izations. Without a model for a leaderless
revolution, the threats to these established
regimes from spontaneously formed crowds of
secular protestors could not be accurately
assessed (38).
Emerging concerns in areas of cyber-
security offer another set of examples.
So-called “zero-day exploits” or “advanced
persistent threats” are examples of risks
embedded inside existing systems that are
amplified as systems become increasingly
connected, where integration creates com-
plex feedbacks between units that were
designed to perform specialized or individual
purposes. Such risks are not visible until after
they have been exploited, presenting a chal-
lenge to traditional modeling. Indeed, the
strategies introduced for controlling and
providing stability in highly complex tech-
nological systems have been known to have
the opposite effect, inadvertently increasing
the risk of cascading impacts in response to
unforeseen changes (4).
Ensuring that risk analysts are properly
oriented can be particularly difficult to ach-
ieve in CAS because collecting information
may alter the behavior of the system’s units,
provoking undesired or unintended adaptive
responses. For example, national intelligence
organizations carefully guard their sources
and methods because they implicitly recog-
nize that their revelation may invite adaptive
changes in their target’s behavior, under-
mining their future use, transforming them
into channels for passing deceptive infor-
mation, and damaging relations with other
actors (39, 40).
Another problem associated with achiev-
ing a proper analytic orientation within CAS
regards establishing the necessary depth
and breadth of analysis. The system and its
components change, and actors perceive and
adapt to their environment as a result of their
unique experiences. Their behavior may de-
viate from the expectations of utility maxi-
mization or rational choice, and analysts are
faced with a challenge of adjusting the ori-
entation of their risk models to incorporate
the effects these nontraditional factors on the
broader systems.
Finally, CAS contain dynamics that oper-
ate on multiple temporal scales. Thus, the
presence of slow-variables, such as cultural or
environmental changes, may be difficult to
perceive and harder to quantify because
they are often masked by higher-frequency
dynamics. These slow variables often es-
tablish boundary or threshold conditions
that inform faster-paced changes in sys-
tems. In the contemporary social systems,
these variables may include demographic
structures, educational and technical skillsets
within populations, changes in ideologi-
cal worldviews, access to credit, Internet
penetration within populations and sub-
populations, the diffusion of small arms, and
so forth. Although none of these may be
determinative of a femtorisk’s materiali-
zation, they may enable or hinder the ability
of a CAS to transition into a new state with
little or no warning. Traditional risk assess-
ments consider only visible dynamics that
occur on faster time scales (41–43).
Improper analytic orientation enables
small systemic risks, which may be easy to
mitigate early on, to grow into crises by the
time they are recognized. Moreover, devoting
continuous attention and resources to varia-
bles that possess little dynamism or cannot be
affected by individual or collective action
imposes opportunity costs by robbing atten-
tion and resources from alternative inter-
ventions that could be more successful in
avoiding or mitigating the social costs posed
by systemic risks. This aspect is particularly
true for strategies that must interact with and
shape global systems, and cannot rely on
discrete “on/off” interactions and or use “exit
strategies” whenever contact between actors
is persistent.
Decision-Making Inertia. Asymmetries
exist in CAS. The actions of individuals or
small groups of well-positioned actors may
push the system beyond bounds of func-
tionality, thus creating femtorisks. The ef-
fective prevention of systemic breakdown
requires collective action by multiple stake-
holders. Therefore, effective risk management
of international CAS is often dependent on
social processes related to the interaction of
analysts and decision makers, even within the
same organization, with challenges com-
pounded when the regulation of different
systems in different national governance
structures require coordination. In addition
to the complexities of analytic assessments of
CAS, these social processes introduce new
sources of complexity as personal and orga-
nizational politics of negotiation and power
come into play (44). Thus, the relationships
between those who assess systemic risks and
those who make decisions about how to ad-
dress them often determine how successfully
analysis is used in decision-making processes.
Even if analysts correctly assess risks within
CAS, decision-makers may be vested in pre-
serving their hard-won political agreements
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or economic advantages, or may question the
accuracy of analyst’s conclusions based on
their own expertise and experiences. As a
result, organizational decision-making often
reveals highly confrontational relationships
between analysts and decision-makers that
influence how information and knowledge
about risks are used (35, 45–50).
This relationship has repeatedly under-
mined the assumptions of rational action
inherent in risk management and the belief
that states and firms are unified actors. In-
stead each has distinctive roles in the as-
sessment and management of risk. Analysts
focus on the substantive aspects of systems,
whether financial markets, critical infra-
structure, international development, cli-
mate, and so forth. Decision-makers wrestle
with a wider range of concerns, but may
possess a narrower organizational or even
personal set of interests, and focus their
efforts on the types of actions that they and
other stakeholders can agree to or impose
given their relative power. Because decision-
makers are involved in a political process, as
opposed to a technical engineering or design
process, they are often reluctant to change
policies, particularly if the costs of doing so
would open existing commitments to re-
negotiation or damage their reputation or
participation in future negotiations. Once
committed, decision makers often neglect
new information that might indicate that
their policies are failing, or ignore the analysis
of specialists that contradicts their expect-
ations (51, 52). This willful blindness can
allow the harmful effects of small risks to
proliferate, diffuse, and amplify.
Biological Models of Adaptation for
Coping with Uncertainty
Adaptive evolution is to large extent shaped
by uncertainty, and the need to respond to
that uncertainty through averaging mecha-
nisms, plasticity, or genetic change. Many
environmental features confronting organ-
isms, like diurnal or seasonal cycles, are
predictable in a probabilistic sense, and have
shaped a range of physiological and behav-
ioral responses; others, however, such as
which pathogens will attack an organism, are
unpredictable and have evolutionarily led to
adaptive responses, such as the vertebrate
immune system. Rather than seek to design
robust institutions and strategies that may
fare well only against specified futures, risk
measurement and management professionals
would benefit from imitating how evolution
has dealt with unknowable challenges, and
take steps toward assuring those responsible
for sustaining global stability and prosperity
possess sufficient learning capabilities and
adaptive capacity to detect and mitigate the
effects of novel risks (53, 54).
In any complex system, robustness [often
termed resilience in the ecological literature
(55)] depends upon the balance among three
interrelated aspects (56): (i) the diversity of
the units within the system, which encodes its
adaptive capacity; (ii) the extent to which the
system contains functional redundancies, pro-
viding insurance against the loss of key ele-
ments; and (iii) the degree of modularity with
respect to the coupling between components.
When taken as a whole, the trade-offs
among these three features enable a system to
keep functioning in the face of changes in its
environment, and provide opportunities for
experimentation to tolerate disruptions and
produce innovations without placing the
entire system at risk (3).
One of the most remarkable triumphs of
evolution, the vertebrate immune system,
provides a model for how to design resilient
systems that can withstand the shocks pro-
duced by femtorisks and mitigate systemic
risks. The key features of this model include:
(i) the maintenance of a set of generic
defenses that can rapidly identify and re-
spond to threats, (as the body does when it
recognizes a pathogen and rushes generalized
antibodies to the site of the threat); (ii) per-
sistent engagements that enable rapid learn-
ing through interaction with threatening
actors or processes (as the body produces
specialized antibodies in response to the in-
vader); (iii) translation lessons from prior
experiences into customized, localized defenses
against previously encountered threats (the
body produces permanent, or at least long-
lasting, defenses against the infection); and (iv)
the maintenance of an archive of previously
experienced threats and the addition of suc-
cessful countermeasures to the set of generic
responses to mitigate future encounters rapidly
(the body’s antibody repertoire).
As a result, the vertebrate immune system
is able to allow organisms to persist de-
spite constantly encountering novel threats
through continuous learning and adaptation.
The traditional rational actor model of de-
cision-making emphasizes observation, cal-
culation, and periodic action, all of which
limit engagements and therefore provide few
opportunities to interact and learn. The evo-
lutionary approach proposed as an alternative
basis for risk management and governance
encourages sustained engagement and feed-
back to create learning opportunities that
enhance the adaptive capacity of international
institutions in many domains.
Enriching Policy
Many of the aspects of the immune system
model have comparable features in in-
ternational relations. For example, studies of
military innovation often emphasize the
complexity of peacetime developments,
when uncertainties about the capabilities
and strategies of other forces proliferate
because of a lack of engagement. Military
planners have recognized the resulting need
to maximize flexibility through the creation
of generic capabilities that can be modified
as new information about rivals’ goals, strat-
egies, tactics, and technologies become
available (57–59). Military organizations
often study one another’s successes and
failures for insights into their own capa-
bilities, as demonstrated by the United States
analysis of Israeli’s air campaign against
Hezbollah in 2006. In addition, military
organizations simulate conflict scenarios
with unproven capabilities or unfamiliar
rivals to generate insights into threats to
maintain an archive of possible counter-
measures for use in an array of possible
future encounters (60, 61). Likewise, foreign
policy professionals often argue in favor
of maintaining ties with rogue states to
strengthen perspective, insights, and strate-
gic context, and increase opportunities to
evolve specialized defenses, and enhance the
coevolution of symbiotic systems (62).
Clearly, some quarters have recognized
that the development of resilient risk-
management schemes, which can cope with
novelty, surprise, and inaccuracies in pre-
dictions, can have important benefits for
public and private sector governance. For
example, an adaptive approach based on
learning through interaction and feedback
accords with the boundedly rational foun-
dation of human cognition and organiza-
tional behavior (63–65). This approach shifts
the evaluative criteria of policy options away
from optimal, often brittle solutions that re-
quire accurate predictions, in favor of resilient
solutions that can be adapted in response to
new information and experiences.
Moreover, diminishing the role of predic-
tions in the formulation of risk-management
strategies and policy can alter the conduct
of decision-making itself by reducing ten-
sions between multiple stakeholders, risk
analysts, and decision-makers. As long as
predictions serve as the basis of decision-
making within organizations, strong incen-
tives exist to control analytic processes and
features, such as the terms of reference and
scope of analysis, sources of data, method-
ology, and so forth, to ensure that partic-
ular personal or organizational perspectives
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prevail in agenda setting. By moving toward
an increasingly adaptive risk-management
framework, decision-making rewards those
actors that can more rapidly gather, process,
and react to new information, activities that
are enriched by searching across broad
ranges of possible futures generated by al-
ternative, competing perspectives on the
system (34). Thus, analytic frameworks for
addressing systemic risks may be more suc-
cessful at solving collective action problems
associated with the governance of CAS by
accepting uncertainty, allowing stakeholders
to discover shared interests and concerns
about potential futures that support the for-
mation of coalitions willing to invest in
learning actions, rather than in practices that
reward bureaucratic maneuvering to see one
set of future risks thrive at the expense of
other views.
Together, these benefits address the
problems associated with the limits of
prediction in CAS, the challenge of proper
orientation by risk analysts, and the need
to reduce inertia in decision-making pro-
cesses by improving relations between
analysts and decision-makers.
The evolutionary model of risk manage-
ment in CAS provides the additional benefit
of aligning with boundedly rational decision-
making exemplified by individuals and
groups. In this approach, decision-makers
reach satisfaction by eliminating options that
are believed to ineffectively manage risks
until they identify an option or set of options
that meet their needs. This approach does not
produce optimal outcomes, but allows for
decision-makers to engage in a continuous
process of adaptation as situations change
and new information about policy opportu-
nities and threats become known.
Another common feature of successful
risk-management strategies and biological
systems is the importance of building on
solutions or capabilities with multiple bene-
fits. For example, improved border security
provides benefits to counterterrorism, coun-
ternarcotics, and illegal immigration. Sim-
ilarly, improvements in public health
monitoring and access to medical services
provide the foundation for the early detection
and mitigation of natural epidemics and
bioterror attacks. Just as in biology, successful
risk mitigation strategies may be generic,
allowing for their reuse in multiple domains
or for many purposes. Thus, rather than
emphasize point solutions that may be opti-
mized to particular risks, risk managers
should prefer capabilities that have positive
externalities and spillover effects.
Evolution provides promising models for
coping with risks because of those models’
ability to cope with uncertainty and relax the
rationality assumptions embedded in tradi-
tional analytic approaches. However, im-
portant differences remain between social
systems and biological ones. In biological
evolution, adaptation occurs as a result of
random search, building upon designs that
worked in the past. By comparison, adapta-
tion in social systems is not purely random as
the search for new solutions to challenges is
based on the interests, ethics, and strategic
anticipation of actors. Although we ad-
vocate the need for an evolutionary model
that emphasizes engagement, learning, and
resilience as opposed to predictability and
optimality, the evolutionary dynamics of
international relations may differ from
those observed in biological systems be-
cause of fundamental differences in their
search processes.
Conclusions
The conceptual framework provided by bi-
ological models of evolution for coping with
threats to the functioning of international
systems calls for new approaches to mea-
suring and managing risk under uncertainty
CAS (66–68). Approaches based on bi-
ological evolution and resilience, which aim
for sustaining systemic functions without
relying on predictions about the future state
of the world, offer a promising model. In-
tegrating this perspective with the game-
theoretical and systems-theory approaches
developed by social science disciplines and
communities of practice for managing sys-
temic risk can offer new perspectives on
public- and private-sector governance over
a multitude of CAS spanning international
systems, from global financial networks, to
critical infrastructure, to the diffusion of so-
cial movements and the rapid collapse of
established regimes (1). These are, however,
games of a different nature than classic the-
ory, emphasizing the interplay between many
individuals in large populations in which
individual agency is essential in explaining
macroscopic consequences. In recent years,
such extensions of game theory have been
termed “mean-field games,” and hold great
potential for addressing the problems con-
sidered here (69–71).
A world of femtorisks makes risk-calcula-
tion much more challenging, as it seems
likely that the probability of some femtorisk
inside critical systems may hover near 1—or
at least should be assumed to be at that level
for planning purposes—although this itself
becomes a challenging problem. For example,
it has been argued by leading bankers, such
as Bank of England Chief Economist Andrew
Haldane, that the problem of the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis was the addition of risk to a
system that was already risk-critical because
of competitive searches for yield by financial
groups (72). Adding in subprime risk was
one grain of sand too many by this logic.
However, what if the issue was not the ad-
dition of more risk, but rather the addition of
more connectivity, which activated embed-
ded femtorisks? In this sense femtorisks
allow us to begin adding precision to the
important fact that connectivity is risk, and
offer the elements of connectivity as areas
for examination.
Globalization will continue to allow new
femtorisks to emerge, as different cultures,
economies, and ecological imperatives create
new frictions in new configurations. With
humility and openness, the new forum pro-
posed herein will develop fresh tools and
perspectives to examine approaches to evolv-
ing complex problems, and might spawn the
conversations and community required to
gather lessons from the broad experience
of this diverse network, and deploy that ex-
perience to help to understand and solve
networked problems.
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